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Anregungen und Empfehlungen 
Chris toph M e i n e l 
Sarton, Science, and the End of History* 
Zusammenfassung: Ausgehend v o n der Frage George Sartons nach der Bedeutung v o n 
A u s c h w i t z und H i r o s h i m a fur die Geschichte der Wissenschaften soli hier der Versuch 
unternommen werden, die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik ein-
mal von ihrem moglichen u n d mit naturwissenschaftlich-technischer Perfektion herbei-
fuhrbaren Ende her z u bedenken: dem atomaren, biologischen und chemischen H o l o -
kaust, der, in Perversion, dann den vollstandigsten T r i u m p h liber die N a t u r bedeutete, 
den Wissenschaft und Technik erringen konnten. M u f i daher die Geschichtsschreibung 
der Naturwissenschaften, wenn sie glaubwiirdig und aufrichtig bleiben w i l l , nicht u m 
historiographische Ansatze u n d Urte i le bemtiht sein, die sich, wenn denn das Ende po-
litisch und technisch schon jetzt erreichbar ist, auch angesichts solcher Perspektive ver-
antworten lassen? 
Schliisselworter: Wissenschaftsgeschichte, George Sarton; X X Jh . 
Sometimes, anniversaries seem to have their o w n rationale. Thus George Sarton's 100th 
anniversary coincided w i t h the fictitious date of George O r w e l P s Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
as it was justly remembered by the editorial "Sarton, Science, and H i s t o r y " i n the his 
Centennial Issue 1 . But have we, as historians of science, really accepted the O r w e l l i a n 
challenge for our o w n discipline? N o doubt, in this century science and its applications 
have revealed their Janus faces. A s historians we k n o w both sides, the contributions of 
science and technology towards the happiness and freedom of m a n k i n d - the very 
basis of Sarton's faith and their contributions towards a degradation of man and 
nature to mere objects and expendable commodities. 
This year we are commemorat ing the end of W o r l d W a r II, just 40 years ago, and the 
first use of the atomic bomb as the deadliest invention ever made by science. Th is might 
be an opportuni ty to recall another, sometimes forgotten, aspect of George Sarton's 
work, since he was a scholar w h o accepted this challenge as a historian of science, and 
often asked himself and his colleagues: What does the war, what does the murder of 
millions of Jews, and what does the bomb o n H i r o s h i m a mean w i t h i n the history of 
science and c iv i l iza t ion , and h o w do these events affect our historical understanding? 
Sarton's a w k w a r d questions are, to some extent, a touchstone of our historical 
conscience, and i n these times they are more urgent than ever. A n d I should l ike to take 
Sarton's argument even a little further, for times have changed considerably since then. 
* This note originated in a discussion paper presented at the annual meeting of the Driburger Kreis in 
September 1984. I owe a special debt to the editor of Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte for permission to 
publish in the language George Sarton would have chosen for such matters; cf. his letter to the editor of 
the New York Evening Post (1919 Feb. 22), reprinted in Isis 2 (1914/19), 320-321. 
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Sarton's answer was part of his biography. In 1914 G e r m a n troops invaded his native 
Belgium and forced h i m to emigrate to England. A few months later he decided that it 
w o u l d be more useful for the cause of peace if he went to the U n i t e d States w h i c h had 
not yet entered war. In fact, one of his reasons for going to A m e r i c a was the idea "to 
organize a new pacifist propaganda w i t h new methods" f r o m the other side of the 
A t l a n t i c 2 . The medium to w h i c h he eventually entrusted this message was no less than 
his journal his, founded at his home at Wondelgem just t w o years before. The bitter 
lesson of W o r l d W a r I, w h i c h , for the fist t ime i n history, was immediately viewed as 
being a war of national sciences and technologies, led Sarton to strive for a new 
humanism, for a " reconci l ia t ion of science and art, t ruth and beauty", in order to build 
a better and more peaceful w o r l d . The core of his message was his belief i n the uni ty of 
m a n k i n d and the uni ty of knowledge, w h i c h was to remain Sarton's creed for the rest 
of his life. H i s editorial War and Civilization3 in the first post-war issue of his of Sep-
tember 1919, and his The Faith of a Humanist* of December of the same year should be 
compared w i t h the notorious Krieg der Geister5 i n order to evaluate the Zeitgeist which 
was prevalent at the t ime of Sarton's confession to pacifism and internationalism. 
H i s monumental Introduction to the History of Science6, the first volume of which 
appeared i n 1927, is the academic fruit of his humanistic credo. " T h e history of 
science", it reads i n the preface, " is the history of mankind's uni ty , of its sublime 
purpose, of its gradual r e d e m p t i o n " 7 . In the same year i n a letter he wrote : " I am 
anxious to prove induct ively the uni ty of knowledge and the uni ty of m a n k i n d " 8 . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , for Sarton, the history of science should play a very decisive role in the 
creation of a new and better w o r l d . In a collection of essays entitled The History of 
Science and the New Humanism9, w h i c h appeared ten years later, he again expressed his 
convic t ion that the light of beauty, t ruth and justice w o u l d i n the end prevail 
undiminished in the history of humani ty over all the temporary defeats infl icted by the 
darkness i n the w o r l d . A lecture entitled The History of Science and the Problems of To-
Day, w h i c h he held i n the Carnegie Institution of Washington i n 1935, begins w i t h a 
parab le 1 0 : 
[...] consider with me two men who are fighting one another. They are of equal strength and courage but 
the one is fair and gentle, while the other is rough, cruel and unfair. Thus the strength of the first is 
jeopardized by the many limitations exacted by his own conscience, while for the other there are no 
limitations whatsoever - anything goes. W h o has the best chance of victory? The second of course. Yet if you 
take mankind as a whole, it is the first who has won. 
Thus the second war Sarton was destined to experience affected h i m deeply as a 
historian of science. " T h e day of M u n i c h was the nadir of m y l i fe " , he is reported to 
have said again and a g a i n 1 1 . A t the end of the war, w i t h forty m i l l i o n dead and six 
m i l l i o n Jews murdered, humani ty had w o n nothing, absolutely nothing. Sarton's 
editorials i n the war issues of his reflect his increasing perplexity. In June 1939 under 
the heading Quousque tandem? he asked about the relation between ethics and 
technological advance 1 2 . In August 1940 he appealed to the republic of letters to protect 
the ideals of humani ty against the darkness of the present 1 3 : 
In the shadow of so many crimes and sufferings can there be a greater consolation than to study and explain 
more clearly the best and highest deeds of the people of every nation and thus to vindicate the goodness of 
man? 
Sarton's editorials then became more and more distinct. Soon he even referred to the 
murderers by name. A t the end of 1942 he w r o t e 1 4 : 
It is truly impossible for decent man to encompass with their minds crimes of such enormity and 
multitude. However, you must try to imagine it, dear Reader, and to remember it. Forgive me for having 
raked up that filth, but I had to. Y o u know that it is not my habit to do so and that I prefer to remain silent, 
but there are times when a man must speak out or his heart would burst. 
F o r Sarton the historian bears responsibil ity for the past and for the f u t u r e 1 5 : 
In the year 2043, our descendants will celebrate the fifth centenary of Copernicus and Vesalius, the fourth 
centenary of Torricelli, the third centenary of d'Alembert, the second centenary of Joseph Plateau and Stuart 
Mill , and the first centenary of what? 
In A p r i l 1944, when the end of the war was already in sight and Sarton quite justly 
feared that its horrors could be all too soon forgotten or thoughtlessly suppressed, he 
reminded his colleagues under the heading Scripta Manent! that the historian cannot 
forget nor be al lowed to forget as long as the sources exist. Because even if the war guilt 
were to be disputed and the murder of Czechs, Poles and Jews denied, the fact that 
Hit ler ' s Mein Kampf was published and had a circulation in the thousands, could not be 
d i sputed 1 6 : 
Mein Kampf is an indestructible monument, which it will be impossible in later times to deny or to ignore. 
It will remain forever an intrinsic part of German culture, which historians of literature or science will have 
to interpret in one way or another; they will not be able, if they be honest, to be silent about it or to explain 
it away. This justifies my editorial. One might say that it is irrelevant in a journal devoted to the history of 
science; it is, on the contrary, highly relevant, and the more we are interested in German science (meaning, 
science in Germany) the more relevant it becomes. [...] O f course, new scientists will appear in Germany 
when the storm is over, but there will remain a solution of continuity which the historians of science of the 
next century will have to account for. Therefore, they will have to speak of Hitler and his henchmen, even as 
historians of science in the fourteenth century must speak of Tamburlaine 1 7 . We are simply anticipating 
them. 
Let us assume that this terrible judgement is correct and that this w i l l be "forever an 
intrinsic part of G e r m a n cul ture" , no different than Gauss, Goethe and Beethoven. If, 
however, this is the case and the attempt to separate the one f r o m the other is neither 
historical nor honest, then A u s c h w i t z and H i r o s h i m a are also intrinsic parts of our 
technological and scientific culture, and not just slips that can be ignored. 
In M a r c h 1948 George Sarton held a lecture at Univers i ty College L o n d o n . Its 
subject, Science and Tradition, represented a renewed attempt to show the significance 
of the history of science for the scientific-technological culture of the future. Sarton had 
not ceased to see i n his discipline the necessary correction for the suffering of his t ime, a 
means of discerning, through w h i c h the humanizat ion of science, and the better society 
he dreamed of, could be a t ta ined 1 8 : 
The question remains and we ask it with more anxiety than ever. " H o w could such a complete perversion 
of humanity happen in one of the most enlightened countries in the most enlightened age?" I have thought 
long and often on that question and my answer is [...] that the German scientists and engineers were partly 
the victims of their "technical" infatuation. They were "technocrats" with a vengeance, and one can see how 
some of M r . Hitler's problems may have excited their technical minds. Absolutely new problems, such as 
this one "What is the simplest and cheapest way of destroying human beings, not individually, nor by the 
thousands, but by the millions?" The problem included enough difficulties, with no precedents for guidance, 
to challenge the ingenuity of the most resourceful technicians. [...] German technicians solved that problem 
and gave the means of destroying ruthlessly and unobtrusively millions of innocent people. Their technical 
concentration and the benumbedness and insensibility which proceeded from it were carried to such a point 
that their minds were closed to humanity and their hearts dulled to mercy. 
In the printed versions of his lecture Sarton at this point added a c o m m e n t 1 9 : 
The reader might stop me here and say "What about the atomic bomb?" The atomic bomb is an 
instrument of warfare, the latest and deadliest weapon invented by men. In a sense war is criminal; it is the 
greatest moral bankruptcy, yet when we are involved in it, there are no alternatives but to beat the adversary 
or be beaten. There is an immense difference between killing men in warfare and murdering them as a 
civilian policy. The Nazi slaughterhouses were not instruments of war, but instruments of civilian 
destruction. The fact remains that we have many "technocrats" in our midst, an increasing number of 
technocratic brutes, without sensibility and without imagination, who do not hesitate to make drastic 
decisions on the grounds of technical efficiency alone without any regard for the feelings of the individuals 
involved. 
The discussion about the responsibil i ty of the scientist for the results of his w o r k , 
continued Sarton i n his lecture of 1948 2 0 , had 
reached a dramatic climax recently apropos of the atomic bomb; if the latter were used for the destruction of 
mankind should we condemn or exonerate the physicists and chemists who brought it into being? 
T h e situation has changed completely in the last forty years. Ethics is no longer the first 
concern, but instead existence itself. The bombs dropped on H i r o s h i m a and Nagasaki, 
and the crematoriums at A u s c h w i t z were test tube experiments compared w i t h what 
scientists and technicians have devised and constructed i n the meantime. The atomic 
b o m b has long ceased to be an instrument of warfare. It has become an instrument of 
c iv i l ian destruction in Sarton's sense. A t a time when the complete destruction of 
m a n k i n d has become a pol i t ical calculation and where maybe half of all the scientists 
and technicians w o r l d w i d e are preparing or already practising the mi l i ta ry annihilat ion 
of life, Sarton's question: " W h a t about the atomic bomb?" , is again crucial for our 
discipline. F o r if it is the case that H i t l e r is just as much a part of G e r m a n culture as 
Gauss, Goethe and Beethoven, and that A u s c h w i t z and H i r o s h i m a cannot be separated 
f r o m the technological-scientific c iv i l iza t ion of the twentieth century, then the feasible 
destruction of m a n k i n d by nuclear weapons w o u l d not be a slip i n the history of 
science, but instead its carefully devised - but f inal result. 
A s historians we are accustomed to analysing developments after they have taken 
place. Examinat ion of the results makes the causes apparent and thus the spectrum of 
the possible is narrowed d o w n to the succession of the factual. W o u l d it not be 
advisable, therefore, to take Sarton's " i f the atomic bomb were used for the destruction 
of m a n k i n d . . . " seriously and to attempt to evaluate the history of science anew f rom 
this point? N o t as the history of increasing clarity and increasing possibilities. Let us 
take its possible end as the point to begin w i t h , the irrevocable end of the history of 
m a n k i n d in its atomic, biological and chemical annihi lat ion, w h i c h w o u l d then also be 
the end of the history of science - devised, calculated, tested and prepared by 
mathematicians, physicists, chemists, biologists and technicians i n the most exacting of 
detail w i t h all their professional abi l i ty. Diabolus ex machina. T h e unshakeable belief in 
the future of m a n k i n d that George Sarton maintained through t w o wars w o u l d be 
meaningless i n the moment w h e n m a n k i n d no longer existed. 
Such a thought-experiment could appear to be questionable f r o m a methodological 
point of v iew, because a method of recording history that attempts to pass judgement 
f r o m a point beyond history cannot really be called historical , no matter whether it 
results f r o m a C h r i s t i a n or Marxis t observance. But sti l l there is a difference. F o r the 
point at w h i c h history ends, because humani ty is no more, this point is n o w i n the 
range of the technically feasible and historically possible, since we have made this goal 
attainable through the customary perfection of our science and technology. 
T o prevent any misunderstanding: we do not want to be prophets of d o o m . The 
abil i ty of the historian to predict the future is just as l imi ted as that of any other 
contemporary. The historian is even less suited to be the apologist of the factual and 
mere chronicler of events. That things are the way they are does not mean that they are 
supposed to be that way or that they had to happen. Historians of science especially 
appear to forget this n o w and again, perhaps because they have become too accustomed 
to the idea that nature herself necessarily dictates the way in w h i c h we deal w i t h her. 
However , it is especially the historian of science w h o , more than any other, is aware of 
the productive tension between the conceivable, the possible and the necessary, out of 
which everything new in the history of m a n k i n d w i t h w o r l d and nature has emerged. 
What do we as historians of science gain when we, at least for a moment, t ry to look 
at science f r o m the perspective of the end of the history of science, when we admit that 
this i n fact w o u l d be the last and complete t r i u m p h that our science and technology 
could achieve over nature, and when we at the same time admit that this end already is 
significantly a part of the history of science, because the rockets are aimed, their trajec-
tories are calculated, and the consequences have been planned. What do we gain then? 
First of all the abil i ty to distinguish. T o distinguish between the historically necessary, 
the historical ly possible and that w h i c h perhaps w o u l d also st i l l have been possible in 
the history of the perception of nature and our dealings w i t h her - and all this in order 
to ask ourselves w h y this or that path was taken, and w h y others w h i c h also w o u l d 
have been possible had not been chosen. 
T o distinguish between gain and loss, because we have perceived that gain also means 
loss and that there were victims in the process of the intellectual and material 
acquisition of nature. D i d not the advanced cultures of Centra l A m e r i c a fall v ic t im to 
the conquest of the N e w W o r l d ? In the seventeenth century, did not w o m a n k i n d have 
to pay the price for the male mechanical philosophy? A n d did not Frederick the Great, 
in that l i t t le -known argument w i t h d 'Alembert , t ry in vain to save poetry f rom the 
clutches of the mathematicians 2 1 ? 
W h e n we have learnt to th ink f r o m the point of the end of the sciences we gain anoth-
er advantage: an invariable point of reference on the other side of all ideological or 
philosophical points of view through w h i c h we can escape the poverty of historicism 
and relativism. W e w o u l d then be able, in fact even summoned, to th ink about w h i c h 
traditions in the history of the sciences lead to the destruction of the w o r l d and w h i c h 
lead to a more human future. W e w i l l then have to ask ourselves whether our historical 
judgement is sti l l val id in view of the possible end, and whether that w h i c h we called a 
gain really was a gain, that w h i c h we called progress really was progress and that w h i c h 
we called an achievement really was an achievement. 
W e w i l l have to ask ourselves whether we, as historians of science, have fulf i l led our 
responsibilities. Has not our discipline often enough contributed to the vei l ing of differ-
ences, to the legi t imizing of demands of power and to the silencing of the victims? A t 
the same time we, the ones w h o k n o w the sources, are also the last w h o could hear the 
voice of the suffering. W o u l d it not be our duty to make people look at the wor ld ' s 
need of healing f r o m the perspective of the victims? 
F ina l ly we w i l l have to ask ourselves h o w we can ful f i l l our responsibility for the 
future, and this so that there w i l l be a future. O u r possibilities as historians are l imited, 
but concrete: we can show and name, w h i c h means that we call murder murder, and 
injustice injustice. D u e to the fact that we have fo l lowed the dialogue between m a n k i n d 
and nature through history, we can show perspectives and offer orientation aids l ike 
Sarton d id w i t h his N e w H u m a n i s m , even if our conclusions might be different. In this 
way we can provide partial steps of cogni t ion and ensure that our discipline becomes an 
area of crit ical reflexion w i t h i n the training of scientists and technicians. 
T o be sure, there is no simple solut ion, no exclusive recipe as to h o w the history of 
science ought to be wri t ten . It w o u l d be intellectually and mora l ly w r o n g to l imi t our 
discipline to any single approach or method. A f t e r al l , historians don't ho ld the key to 
the wor ld ' s salvation. But if we as historians of science want to remain credible, then we 
have to strive for a historical judgement that we can justify even in view of A u s c h w i t z 
and H i r o s h i m a , and even in view of the destruction of our environment and the danger 
of nuclear annihi la t ion , and this independently of whatever subject or whatever period 
we are w o r k i n g in indiv idua l ly . H e r e it is not so much the question of an ethical 
responsibil i ty of the scientist and the consequences of his actions and discoveries that 
are important , but rather the question of a fundamental new determination of the 
relationship between man, nature and c u l t u r e 2 2 . T h e o d o r A d o r n o was w r o n g when he 
said that no more poems could be wri t ten after A u s c h w i t z . T h e history of science also 
has not come to its end, but instead has been given a new and unpostponable task f rom 
the possible end of history. H o w e v e r , we are just beginning. 
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Dokumentation und Information 
Robert-Remak-Fonds bei der Gesellschaft fiir Wissenschaftsgeschichte 
Im M a i 1985 ist bei der Gesellschaft f i i r 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte ein mit 50 000 D M 
ausgestatteter Robert-Remak-Fonds einge-
richtet worden . D i e Gelder sollen nach 
dem W i l l e n der Stifter f i ir die W u r d i g u n g 
von Leben u n d W e r k Robert Remaks und 
die Bearbeitung seines wissenschaftlichen 
Nachlasses V e r w e n d u n g finden. 
D e r Berl iner M e d i z i n e r Robert Remak 
(1815- 1865) gehorte z u den bedeutenden 
Forschern und A r z t e n , die die Berliner 
Schule nach 1850 gepragt haben. A l s Schii-
ler v o n Johannes M i i l l e r u n d Johann L u -
kas Schonlein entwickelte er schon in den 
40er Jahren Vorstel lungen iiber die Bedeu-
tung der Zel le i m Krankheitsgeschehen, 
die R u d o l f V i r c h o w wenige Jahre spater 
mit dem E n t w u r f der Zellularpathologie 
zur Weltgeltung bringen sollte. Bahnbre-
chend w u r d e n Remaks A r b e i t e n auf dem 
Gebiet der Galvanotherapie, i n denen er 
seine neurophysiologischen Erkenntnisse 
mit k l in ischen Z w e c k e n verband. D o c h 
i m Gegensatz z u anderen Kol legen der 
Berliner Universi tat blieb Remak die au-
Kere A n e r k e n n u n g weitgehend versagt. 
Einer der G r i i n d e hierzu lag i n der H a l -
tung der preufiischen Universitaten ge-
geniiber Gelehrten judischen Glaubens. 
Remak wurde 1848 der erste jiidische P r i -
vatdozent Preufiens, 1859 erreichte er die 
Ernennung z u m Aufierordentl ichen Pro-
fessor. 
N a c h k o m m e n Robert Remaks, die in 
der N a z i z e i t nach England auswanderten, 
nahmen seinen wissenschaftlichen N a c h -
lafi zusammen mit anderen Famil iendo-
kumenten mit i n die Emigrat ion . V o r ei-
nigen Jahren beschlossen die noch leben-
den U r e n k e l Remaks, diesen Nachlaf i als 
ein Stuck deutsch-jiidischer Wissenschafts-
geschichte nach Deutschland zuruckzu-
bringen. Sie verkauften die Manuskr ipte 
Remaks zusammen mit zahlreichen wert-
vol len Briefen beruhmter Zeitgenossen 
(darunter f i infz ig Briefe seines Forderers 
Alexander v o n H u m b o l d t ) an die Staatsbi-
bliothek in Ber l in und setzten den Er los 
f i ir eine wissenschaftliche Bearbeitung 
aus. D i e Gesellschaft f i i r Wissenschaftsge-
schichte wurde dam it beauftragt, die aus-
gesetzte Summe z u verwalten u n d f i ir ihre 
Verwendung i m Sinne der Stifter z u sor-
gen. Das G e l d soil in erster L i n i e f i i r die 
Unters t i i tzung v o n Veroffentl ichungen 
(so vor allem fi ir Druckkostenzuschiisse, 
eventuell auch Reisemittel oder Material -
kosten) bereitgestellt werden. N a c h der 
zwischen der Gesellschaft und den Stif-
tern getroffenen Vereinbarung, die recht-
